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Abstract
Econometrics is based on the nonempiric notion of utility. Prices,
dynamics, and market equilibria are supposed to be derived from
utility. Utility is usually treated by economists as a price potential,
other times utility rates are treated as as Lagrangians. Assumptions
of integrability of actions and dynamics are implicitly and uncritically
made. In particular, economists assume that price is the gradient of
utility in equilibrium, but I show instead that price as the gradient of
utility is an integrability condition for the Hamiltonian dynamics of
an optimization problem in econometric control theory. One
consequence is that, in a nonintegrable dynamical system, price
cannot be expresssed as a function of demand or supply variables.
Another consequence is that utility maximization does not describe
equilibrium. I point out that maximization of the Gibbs entropy of the
observed price distribution of an asset would describe equilibrium, if
equilbrium could be achieved, but equilibrium does not describe real
markets. To emphasize the inconsistency of the economists’ notion of
‘equilibrium’, I discuss both deterministic and stochastic descriptions
of the dynamics of excess demand and observe that Adam Smith’s
stabilizing hand is not to be found either in deterministic or stochastic
dynamical models of markets, nor in the observed motions of asset
prices. Evidence for stability of prices of assets in free markets simply
has not been found.
20. Overview
Section 1 defines utility, marginal utility and ‘General Equilibrium
Theory’ (GET), which postulates price as the gradient of utility as an
equilibrium condition. ‘Equilibrium’ is believed by economists to be
defined by utility maximization.
Part 2 introduces the dynamics of GET, the Arrow-Block-Hurwicz
model (ABH), and the search for stable equilibria in econometrics.
Motion toward a unique stable equilibrium point, if it occurs,
represents the universal action of Adam Smith’s hand. Scarf showed
that it is easy to construct models where stable equilibria do not
occur. Saari pointed out that chaos is not excluded. I add the
observation that deterministic excess demand dynamics also does
not exclude complexity. In any case, Adam Smith’s invisible hand is
not there to match supply to demand in unregulated free markets.
Parts 1 and 2 form the background for part 3.
Part 3 contains the first main result of the paper. There, I discuss the
Hamiltonian systems that arise from the use of optimization and
control theory in econometrics. I point out that the condition that
price is a gradient of utility is an integrability condition for the
dynamics, not an equilibrium condition, that utility is generally a
functional, not a function, and that stable equilibria cannot occur at
all in this context.
Part 4 follows the pioneer Osborne in discussing markets and trading
via a toy model of limit orders, and follows Black in observing that
noise is essential for liquidity. Here, I emphasize the behavior of
excess demand in real, liquid markets in favor of the econometric
notions and models of parts 1-3, like price as a function of demand
and ABH dynamics, that are empirically inapplicable to real markets.
Section 5 introduces Osborne’s lognormal model of noisy stock
prices. The CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) is derived from
white noise. This sets the stage for the simplest possible derivation of
the Black-Scholes equation in part 6, and also for criticizing the
economists’ notion of ‘equilibrium’ in part 8.
3 In section 6, following Black, the Black-Scholes option pricing model
is derived from the CAPM. It is observed that the notion of utility
(along with Adam Smith’s hand) is not used in modeling stock prices
and apparently can be forgotten. Parts 4-6 form the background for
part 8.
Section 7 explains why the study of prices as deterministic flows in
the ABH model and control theory, even in the chaotic or complex
case, cannot model the observed random noise in stock prices at
short times.
Part 8 contains the second main result of the paper. There, I note that
there is no idea of stability or equilibrium in the stochastic dynamics
used to model asset prices, and that neither the lognormal nor the
observed (exponential) empirical distribution defines an ‘equilibrium’
price that characterizes the market. Adam Smith’s hand is observed
to have disappeared altogether, because there are no restoring
forces: excess demand is described as pure random noise. The
economists mislabel stochastic dynamics as ‘equilibrium dynamics’
because they maximize expected utility (which does not guarantee
equilibrium) instead of maximizing entropy which would, if
equilibrium were possible. I define entropy as the Gibbs entropy of
the observed price distribution.  The observation that markets are
nearly never in equilibrium runs counter to Black’s stated belief that
equilibrium always prevails in the long run. I also speculate on what
Black may have meant by ‘equilibrium’.
Part 9 informs the reader of Osborne’s observation that the supply-
demand ‘graphs’ in Samuelson’s text are merely cartoons that have
not been, and cannot be, derived from empirical data.
Part 10 summarizes and concludes with the expectation that
econometrics in its present form cannot survive.
1. What is econometrics?
The prevailing notion of western econometrics, expressed in
standard texts, begins with Adam Smith’s idea of an ‘invisible hand’
that is supposed somehow to provide stability and fulfill wants
optimally by matching supply to demand in free, unregulated
4markets. Since smith did not and could not describe how this was
supposed to work, it has been the main job of econometrics to try to
mathematize the idea. The idea of static equilibrium, borrowed from
physics, plays a main role in econometric theorizing. An equilibrium
market is defined [1,2] as one where the match of supply to demand
determines the price of a commodity. In such a market trades are
imagined to take place only at the equilibrium price. In order to
mathematize, the notion of ‘utility’ is invented. The following
mathematics, which I will call econo-logic, is thereby postulated as
the underpinning of General Equilibrium Theory (GET). The main
purpose of part 4 of this paper is to discuss a simplified example of a
real, liquid market where this idea fails completely, the stock market.
First, in parts 1-3, I will review the economists’ reasoning and add
some new, more precise criticism than has been provided by others,
including Black (see part 10 below).
Given n commodities in quantities x1,....xn, a function U(x1,...xn),
called ‘satisfaction’ (economists call it ‘utility’) is postulated. Utility is
supposed to describe consumer preferences, but only for a ‘rational’
consumer. A rational consumer is one who maximizes utility subject
to a budget constraint, completing the circle. The function U is
assumed to be concave, building in the assumption of decreasing
returns: less satisfaction from eating five ice-cream cones than from
eating one. Because utility functions cannot be derived without more
information, one must consider the entire class of concave utility
functions. The attempted classification is topologically well-defined
only locally, not globally, because it is not invariant under arbitrary
nonlinear coordinate transformations.
Equilibrium is described as the result of maximizing U subject to a
budget constraint [1]  
 M = px = constant    (1)
where x is the state vector in commodity space with entries xi and p is
a covector (“co-state vector”) whose ith entry is the price pi  of the i
th
commodity. I have used matrix notation
5 
px = (p1...pn)
x1
xn
= p1x1 + ... + pnxn
   (1b)
but sometimes below will use Gibbs notation
  
∇p•ε(p) =
∂εi
∂pi
Σ
i = 1
n
             (1c)
to denote inner products of covectors with vectors. Maximizing the
utility subject to the budget constraint (1)  yields
  pi = λ ∂U∂xi ,                  (2)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The utility slopes along the various
Cartesian axes are called marginal utilities. According to
economists, equilibrium prevails whenever
  
marginal satisfaction of eating beans
price of N beans
=
marginal satisfaction of owning a BMW
price of a BMW
= ... = λ
(3)
An old assumption is to try to identify λ as the marginal utility of
money.
It’s not clear that (3) correctly describes eating beans: eating five
beans is more satisfying than eating one bean, if you like beans,
although eating ten thousand beans at one sitting, compared with
eating ten beans, probably is not. This math-mythology also does not
describe stock market bubbles where higher prices invite still higher
prices (increasing returns) until the crash. Human satisfaction is
surely more complex than is assumed within the confines of econo-
logic (neo-classical economics), but let us not become mired in less
fruitful objections at this point. Fundamental, fatal flaws in the
econometric definition of  ‘equilibrium’ will be analyzed in parts 2, 3,
and 8 below. Toward that end I begin historically, motivated by
Mirowski’s (stimulating but incomplete) criticism [3] of the
asumption that utility exists as a function of demand or supply
variables.
6There is a long-standing internal inconsistency in GET: given a price
covector p(x) (price as a function of supply or demand x) the integral
 A r = pdx
C             (4)
typically depends on the integration path C. Utility is defined by
integrating a nonintegrable differential form [3,4], so that utility is
more like 'heat', or a Lagrangian, than potential energy or free
energy. Utility is a path-dependent functional, not a function, unless
an integrability requirement is satisfied by the differential form 
 pdx .
The integrability condition is generally not satisfied, but this has not
stopped econometricians from assuming utility functions in their
model-making. Samuelson [4] tried to argue the integrability
problem away by suggesting that if consumers would only behave in
a certain way then utility would be path-independent. This is a good
example of econo-logic, but it would be like trying to change the
empirical data to fit the theory rather than the reverse, if empirical
data had been used. The general problem of nonintegrability has
been faced at an elementary level but was never solved within
econometrics. Typically, integrability has been assumed at all levels
in econometrics whenever it was convenient to do so, including in
dynamical generalizations of GET (see especially part 3 below).
Adam Smith’s invisible hand does not have a chance to act in the
hypothetical trading that occurs at equilibrium in GET. The hand did
not bring prices together because nothing was done to reach
equilibrium (no dynamics were involved). To remedy this dynamics-
gap Walras suggested that we imagine that an auction has occured
in order to reach equilibrium. Adam Smith’s invisible hand is then a
synonym for the bidding and price adjustments during the bidding.
Imagine many traders at a market, each with his own initial
commodity vector xo held with initial price covector po. An
auctioneer, called the Walras auctioneer, calls out a price vector p.
Each trader computes his excess demand
  ε1(p) = (p – po)x     (5)
7and adjusts his prices accordingly. Excess demand (supply) in a
particular commodity means that the price must increase (decrease)
before the next round of bidding. This continues until the total excess
demand for all traders vanishes, which defines equilibrium. Trades
are then allowed to occur. Most real markets do not behave this
way. Adam Smith’s main idea, the notion of a trader making a profit
(financial friction), is completely eliminated from the price-
adjustment process of GET. In the face of such criticism economists
tend to reply: “You misunderstand the idea of equilibrium due to the
balance of supply and demand. We only want to prove the existence
of equilibrium”, where, by “proof”, they mean only mathematically,
not empirically. In statistical physics, in contrast, the thermodynamic
limit is generally impossible to prove mathematically but very good
approximations to thermal equilibrium are accurately observed in
careful, controlled experiments. An example is given by experiments
that measure the specific heat at constant pressure to the fifth
decimal place near a second order transition. This analolgy is
important because the notions of utility and equilibrium were lifted
historically from physics, partly from dynamics and partly from
thermodynamics [3].
In the trial and error (‘Tatonnement’) price-adjustment process
described above stability of equilibrium was assumed implicitly,
otherwise no equilibrium is reached during the auction. In order to
model Adam Smith’s invisible hand, which must always move prices
toward a stable equilibrium point in classical and neo-classical
economics, we must invent a dynamical system and study stability.
Invention, as opposed to nature with unique Newtonian dynamics, is
not unique, so we are forced from the start to consider topological
classes of dynamics by having to fall back on mathematical
postulation rather than Galilean empiricism. The nontrivial
difficulties facing anyone who might want to try to discover the
correct topological dynamics class for a given market from statistics
or time series analysis are discussed in [5].
2. Arrow-Block-Hurwicz dynamics
In order to discuss stability of the predicted equilibria the
econometrician, with no Galileo-Kepler-Newton shoulders to stand
on, must first invent a class of dynamics models.
8In ABH dynamics [6] one starts as above by postulating a scalar utility
function U whose gradient is assumed proportional to the price
covector for n commodities
  pi = λ ∂U∂xi .                 (5b)
The commodities are represented by a vector x in commodity space,
where the entries defining x are the quantities of each commodity
held, supplied, or demanded, depending on the context. Commodity
space is implicitly taken to be flat, otherwise x is not a vector. One
then has two separate spaces, price space and commodity space, and
these are not yet thought of as a phase space in GET. Given price as
a function of demand (or supply) x, one must then be able to invert
the relationship (5) to find demand as a function of price, x = d(p).
Given that one holds n commodities at time t, the usually assumed
budget constraint [1,7] (Walras' 'law') says that the sums of prices
times numbers of commodities held at time 0 must be the same as the
prices times quantities of commodities held at any later time t. That
is, the scalar product (in our inner product commodity space)
  M = px             (6)
will automatically be conserved when we get around to building the
dynamics. The excess demand ε1(p) is then formed in commodity
space for one consumer, the ith consumer,
  εi(p) = px – pxo ,           (7)
where xo represents the quantities of each commodity initially held
before the ‘Walras auction’ begins. Having constructed the excess
demand for n commodities for one consumer one then uses
permutation symmetry to write down the total excess demand vector
for each commodity for m consumers. This yields the total excess
demand vector ε(p). The ABH model simply assumes that the price
changes obey
9dp/dt = ε(p),                (8)
so that Walrus’ auction has been replaced by a flow in p-space.
Equilibrium is described as vanishing excess demand, and the process
is still called Tatonnement.
That a flow should be called ‘trial and error’ appears peculiar at first
sight, because what could be further from the notion of an auction
than a flow? However, if we construct solutions to (8) using Picard’s
method of repeated approximations then we have a trial and error
approach to the exact solution that is guaranteed to converge
whenever a Lipshitz condition is satisfied by the excess demand. The
solution, however, needn’t be an equilibrium solution and generally
isn’t, even as the time goes to infinity (this is a not only a question of
existence and stability of equilibria, but of basins of attraction).
The Walras condition (the budget constraint M = constant)) means
that that the vectors p and ε(p) are perpendicular. This constraint
confines the motion to an n-sphere in price space. General
Equilibrium Theory then tries to restrict the studies to excess
demands that have a unique equilibrium, and mainly searches for
those equilibria, which is rather boring mathematics with trivial,
uninteresting (not to mention inapplicable) dynamics. The search for
a globally-unique equilibrium was a way to try to justify the
universality of Adam Smith’s invisible hand, the notion that, given a
free market, the same conditions should lead to equilibrium in
Moscow, Mexico City, New York, London, and Frankfurt. In this
restricted picture, trading only occurs at equilibrium. Aside from the
fact that trading nearly never occurs at equilibrium in real markets,
asking for universality of solutions of dynamics equations for
arbitrary initial conditions is too high an expectation. Even if the
ABH model were qualitatively applicable Moscow and New York
could well belong to different basins of attraction (nonuniversality of
effects of excess demand), and equilibria need not hold in either
market.
With only two commodities integrability is guaranteed by elementary
calculus. Integrable dynamics models with three commodities are
discussed in the readable paper by Scarf [7]. Integrable models with
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three commodities have the nice property that the excess demand
vector must be the cross product in price space of the gradients of
two global functionally-independent conservation laws G1 and G2
[8],
  ε1(p) = µ∇G1x∇G2 ,         (9)
where µ is Jacobi’s multiplier. Scarf then shows that it is easy to
construct model utilities where there is no approach to equilibrium by
giving several nice examples, one of which has an unstable focus
surrounded by a stable limit cycle [1].
An approach to equilibrium requires a driven dissipative system,
which requires that the divergence of the excess demand vector in
price space cannot vanish identically,
  ∇•ε(p) ≠ 0 .            (10)
Smale's [9] 'global Newton method' of locating equilibria, if
equilibria exist, implicitly uses the n-1 time-independent
conservation laws Gi of driven dissipative systems. The existence of
n-1 local conservation laws for driven dissipative systems
(integrable or not) was brought out in the open by Palmore [10], who
was the first to emphasize that the damped simple harmonic
oscillator has a global conservation law and actually constructed the
invariant. Many of today’s physicists and mathematicians seem to
have trouble accepting the fact that even planar dissipative flows
have a conservation law, although it was known to Jacobi and Lie
and is trivial mathematics. In a driven dissipative system these
conservation laws are singular at equilibria. Arnol'd [11] therefore
refuses to label them as ‘first integrals’, but they are nevertheless
conserved quantities, whether so-labeled by Arnol’d or not.
In a nonintegrable system the conservation laws exist only locally
[5,8,11] so that the interactions can be transformed away only locally
(the flow can be parallelized only locally), never globally. There are
mathematical (but not economically realistic) conditions under which
stable equilibria occur and are unique [1,6], but Scarf shows that it is
easy to construct counter-examples where, e.g., an unstable
equilibrium is enclosed by a stable limit cycle. Saari [12] points out
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that the class of more generally admissible excess demand vectors is
so great that nothing, especially not deterministic chaos, is
precluded. In other words, Adam Smith’s invisible hand cannot be
relied upon to match supply to demand globally. At best, it is a local
phenomenon if it occurs at all in this theory. We now also know that
flows in phase space may not be merely chaotic, they may be complex
(no scaling laws, computer-like behavior, surprises at all length
scales [5,13]). In other words, the invisible hand does not guarantee
that equilbrium is stable, or even exists for an arbitrary excess
demand in the allowed topological class, and there is no reason at all
to believe in the universality of the effects excess demand on the basis
of GET. As with all dynamics problems, the important effects are all
local, not global. On the basis of econometric analysis, what works in
New York need not work in Tokyo, Frankfurt, Paris, or Zurich. Or,
what works for Microsoft need not work for Novartis. Some leading
dynamical systems theorists have hoped that econometrics would be
useful [14], and some have gone over to econometrics [1,15], but GET
has never proven to be empirically useful.
Leaving aside the failure of the invisible hand to regulate the entire
world in a trivial way, there are other more serious objections to the
ABH model. First, what is the relaxation time for prices? This is a
very good question because theoretical econometrics implicitly
assumes extremely rapid relaxation to equilibrium. This seems
strange to physicists, but we must remember that econometrics,
especially GET, is more like a belief-system or logic-system than it is
like physics or any other science. Unfortunately for physicists who
might want try to do better, the left hand side of the ABH equation (8)
has units of $/sec, Euros/sec, or Yen/sec, whereas the right hand side
(excess demand) is a pure number, and there is no way to discover a
fundamental constant (a global invariant) with dimensions of
money/time to repair this defect. Relaxation times simply cannot be
predicted on the basis of the ABH model as it now stands. One could
multiply ε(p) by an interest rate to get the right units, but this would
be arbitrary and meaningless.
Lying in the same boat is the question of the relaxation time of the
commodity variables x. In the ABH model the prices are slaved to the
commodity variables, which are implicitly presumed to relax
infinitely fast: there are no differential equations
12
 dx/dt = s(p,x)     (11)
for the commodity variables. A physicist might ignore the Walras law
(the budget constraint), because physicists are usually pretty good at
violating budgets anyway. Let’s do this and look at a vaguely
analogous mathematics problem in physics, a Hamiltonian system
where x is position (phase space can always chosen to be flat [8]) and
the covector p is the corresponding canonical momentum. If
  p = ∇U.                (12)
where U is a scalar function of x, then  the dynamics is globally
integrable [8] and the motion is confined to an n-dimensional cylinder
or torus in the 2n-dimensional (x,p) phase space. Einstein pointed out
that assuming that p = grad U is equivalent to assuming integrability
of the dynamical system [16], although this was shown earlier in
Liouville’s more complete explanation of integrability [17]. This is a
formal non-economic analog of Walras’ law. Here, there is no
dissipation, and so there are no stable equilibria in phase space, only
elliptic and hyperbolic points. For bounded motion one has eternal
oscillation (with neutral stability). The function U is just the reduced
action in this case. The condition for (12) (discussed explicitly by
Liouville but not by Einstein) is that there are n global commuting
constants of the motion, n global conservation laws of the
Hamiltonian system. This then guarantees that Ldt is an exact
differential in the x’s and t, where L is the Lagrangian, so that the
action is now a function (a generating function). The canonical
momentum then is the x-gradient of the action or the reduced action.
If, on the other hand, the dynamics is nonintegrable, as is typically
the case, then the reduced action
 A r = p
C
dx
            (13)
 is a path-dependent functional, not a function, so that the analog of
the utility U exists at best locally, not globally, and cannot even be
written down as an infinite series without using analytic
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continuation. This might seem very far fetched as economics, but
Hamiltonian systems do occur in econometrics (see section 3 below).
Hamiltonian dynamics shows that it is dangerous blindly to assume
that the question of path dependence of a utility functional (13) can be
divorced from the question of integrability of the underlying
dynamics. If Mirowski [3] is correct about the history, then Gibbs
tried but failed to make a similar point to I. Fisher. Gibbs  presumably
pointed out that the utility is generally path dependent, and
suggested that Fisher address the problem of nonintegrability in
relation to a possible underlying dynamics. Fisher did not understand
nonintegrability of differential forms (neither did Walras or Pareto),
so that Gibbs’ point was apparently lost on Fisher, who erased all
mention of nonintegrability from his last papers on utility after he
had become established as an economist. We can speculate that Gibbs
knew and understood Liouville’s integrability theorem in
Hamiltonian mechanics and had in mind precisely the discussion
above. We don’t know. We do know that Fisher’s inability to address
and resolve the question of the general path-dependence of utility
left Samuelson and other economists to worry about nonintegrability
some fifty years later. Most economists finally stopped worrying
about it, but without having solved the problem. Others thought that
merely writing down Slutsky relations (‘Maxwell relations’) was the
answer. Mirowski made the mistake of trying to identify utility with
potential energy, instead of action, in classical mechanics. The
problem posed by Mirowski’s stimulating criticism is solved next in
part 3.
3. Control via optimization in econometrics
The Hamiltonian approach in econometrics allows us partly to
repair two flaws in the ABH model in a simple way: a time scale can
in part be introduced into the dynamics problem, and equations of
motion for demand/supply ( or “production”) variables x are
introduced.
Hamiltonian systems fall out of optimization problems in control
theory [18] because every variational principle formally yields a
Hamiltonian system [19]. In econometrics the Hamiltonians that
occur are not of the form studied by physicists, but many general
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theorems on Hamiltonian mechanics, especially Liouville’s
integrability theorem, apply independently of the form of the
Hamiltonian. A Hamiltonian dynamical system is a group theoretic
idea arising from a variational principle [20].
We  begin with the discounted utility functional (the price of money is
discounted at the rate e-bt, e.g.)
 A = e–btu(x,v,t)dt
           (14)
where u(x,v,t) is the undiscounted ‘utility rate’ and v is a set of
control variables or control functions (“instruments”). Optimize
utility with respect to the ‘set of instruments’ v, but subject to the
constraint
 x = s(x,v,t)                (15)  
where s is the production function (this is Mayer’s problem in the
calculus of variations [20]). The system (15) may be driven-dissipative
in commodity space with the variables v held constant ((15) could be
a damped linear oscillator or a Lorenz model, e.g.). Optimization
yields
  δA = dt(δ(e–bt(u + p’δ(s(x.v.t) – x)) = 0
   (16)
where the p’i are the Lagrange multipliers.  The extremum conditions
are
 H(x,p’,t) = maxv(u(x,v,t) + p’s(x,v,t)) ,        (17)
  ∂u
∂vi
+ p’k
∂sk
∂vi
= 0
,                       (17b)
(sum over repeated index k) which yields ‘the positive feedback form’
15
 v = f(x,p,t) .            (18)
Substituting (18) into (17) yields.
  H(x,p’,t) = maxv(u(x,v,t) + p’s(x,v,t))
p’= bp’– ∇xH
x = ∇
’
H = S(x p’,t)         (19)
where, with v = f(x,p’,t) determining the maximum in (17),            
S(x,p’,t) = s(x,f(x,p’,t),t). The integral A in (14) is just the Action (the
discounted utility rate is the Lagrangian).
It is easy to prove (19) by using by using the chain rule. To show that
we actually have a Hamiltonian system, use the discounted utility
rate w(x,v,t) = e-bt u(x,v,t) with 
 p = e±btp'  to find
  h(x,p,t) = maxv(w(x,v,t) + ps(x,v,t))
pi = – ∂h∂xi
xi =
∂h
∂pi = Si(x.p.t) ,      (20)
which is a Hamiltonian system. Whether or not (15) with constant v’s
is driven-dissipative this system is phase-volume preserving, is
conservative (and h is generally time dependent).
In (19) we have a time scale determined by the discount rate b,
  p’= bp’– ∇xH ,             (21)
although Hamiltonian term in the excess demand still has no clearly
defined units, so this is not a complete fix. This dynamical system
generally does not obey Walras’ budget constraint. The Lagrange
canonical momenta pi are called ‘shadow prices’ for the production
or investment process. If we think momentarily of pi as ‘money’ and b
16
as an interest rate, then bpi contributes to the total excess demand for
money (negative interest b < 0 is possible, and was issued in special
cases by the Bank of Japan during 1999). The entire right hand side of
(21) must be thought of as excess demand εi(p) for commodity xi.
In this formulation the discounted utility rate L = w(x,v,t)                      
= e-bt u(x,v,t) is the Lagrangian L,. Since the Hamiltonian h depends
on time it isn’t conserved, but integrability occurs if there are n global
commuting conservation laws. These conservation laws typically do
not commute with the Hamiltonian h(x,p), and are generally time-
dependent [8,17]. The integrabilty condition (due to n commuting
global conservation laws) can be written as
  p = ∇U(x)    (12)
where for bounded motion the utility U(x) is multivalued (turning
points of the motion in phase space make U multivalued). U is just
the reduced action given by (13), which is a path-independent
functional when integrability (12) is satisfied (so is the action A given
by (14)). When satisfied, the integrability condition eliminates chaotic
motion (and complexity) from consideration because there is then a
global, differentiable canonical transformation to a coordinate
system where the motion is free particle motion (n commuting
constant speed translations on a flat manifold imbedded in the 2n
dimensional phase space). Conservation laws correspond, as usual,
to continuous symmetries of the dynamical system (20).
Note that if integrability holds so that U = Ar then p is not merely
‘shadow price’ but is, according to the economists, simply ‘price’.
There is no difference between calculating p as the gradient of A or Ar
in the integrable case. Either way, one gets the same price covector p.
However, the corresponding p is not an ‘equilibrium’ price covector
because (12) is not an equilibrium condition, in spite of the fact that
the utility rate w(x,v,t) is maximized with respect to the instruments
v while maintaining the production rate constraint.
The equilibria that fall out of control problems in the 2n dimensional
phase space of the Hamiltonian system (20) cannot be attracting (are
not stable). By Liouville’s theorem (which is all that’s needed to
prove Poincare’s recurrence theorem whenever the motion is
17
bounded) equilibria are either elliptic or hyperbolic points (sources
and sinks in phase space are impossible in a Hamiltonian system).
Bounded motion guarantees that there is eternal oscillation (stable
or unstable), with no approach to equilibrium, because either the
motion is neutrally stable with elliptic points as equilibria, or all
equilibrium points are unstable (hyperbolic) and the motion may be
chaotic or complex (no example of the latter has been constructed but
Moore [13, 21] has suggested that it may occur for n = 3, whereas
chaos requires only n = 2). For unbounded motion there must be at
least one hyperbolic point. Integrable motion that is not oscillatory
must be unbounded (see [22] for examples in econometrics).
Econometricians still call hyperbolic points “stable” [22], by which
they mean: choose initial conditions on the stable asymptote. To do
this, Adam Smith’s hand is presumed to be infinitely precise and
certainly cannot be subject to any noise.
If we have an integrable system (20) and use (12) to find demand as a
function of price, x =d(p,t), then we can substitute back into the right
hand side of the price equation in (20) to obtain
  p = ε(p,t)              (8b)
which is not a volume-preserving flow in the in the n+1 dimensional
price-time subspace of phase space because
  
∇p•ε(p,t) =
∂εi
∂pi
Σ
i = 1
n
= – Σ
i = 1
n ∂2h
∂xi∂pi
≠ 0
 .   (8c)
In other words we end up with a special case of non-phase volume
preserving ABH dynamics. It’s instructive for a physicist to solve the
simple harmonic oscillator by this method: the equilibria that are
defined by setting  the right hand side of (8b) equal to zero are not
oscillator equilibria in the full phase space, but only represent that
the oscillator passes through the equilibrium position with either
positive or negative finite momentum ((12) is not an equilibrium
condition!).
18
Should central bankers and economic planners have faith in
econometric models that are based on controlling a finite number of
instruments vi? No, because models with chaotic or even complex
motions cannot be ruled out of consideration. All of the models have
hyperbolic points as equilibria [22], which asks too much of Adam
Smith’s hand.
In formal welfare economics one assumes additive utilities [1]: one
satisfaction function per “agent”. An “agent” may be a consumer, the
Fed, a factory, or a welfare recipient, depending on the context.
Pareto efficiency is defined by maximizing the utility of one agent
while holding the utilities of the other n-1 agents constant. A Pareto
efficient allocation is purported to describe the best welfare
distribution: each agent/recipient is supposed to be as well off as
possible, given the utilities of other recipients. Pareto efficiency, now
popular in legal circles [23], is only a mathematical model that
generally does not describe reality. Utility functions don’t exist in the
absence of integrable dynamics, and integrability vs, nonintegrability
cannot be decided in court. Some high courtroom decisions are,
however, motivated by arguments from utility maximization.
The main point of this section could have been discovered by Sato
[24], who applied Frobenius’ theorem on integrability to equation (12)
(this is somewhat analogous to cracking a nut with a
sledgehammer). He did not apply similar mathematical horsepower
to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation, which was discussed at the level of
Goldstein or Landau-Lifshitz, rather than at the level of Whittaker,
near the end of his book on the use of symmetries and Lie methods in
econometrics.
4. A toy model of the stock market
Trading of commodities is postulated to occur in GET only at
equilibrium where supply exactly matches demand, just like the
pictures (’graphs’) in Samuelson’s text [2] (the ‘graphs’ in that text do
not follow from real data or real theories, but are just sketches of
expectations based on the unverified speculations of GET). At
equilibrium agents hypothetically buy/sell reversibly, without any
loss, in analogy with the reversible transformation of ice into water
at zero degrees centigrade, or like the reversible transfer of random
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kinetic energy into work in a Carnot engine. Approximately
reversible water-ice transformations are possible in carefully
controlled experiments, but low financial-friction trading is usually
possible only in very liquid markets over the shortest time intervals,
at best. Markets in Europe are generally irreversible (sales are
generally final). For example, Karstadt will not likely refund your
money later in the afternoon after a morning purchase just because
your wife doesn’t like the color of the shirt you bought. Some
markets in the US are reversible: if you buy a pair of Jeans at K Mart
or Dillard’s you can usually reverse the trade perfectly on a time
scale of a few days (ignoring gasoline costs and wear and tear on the
car). Most markets are not liquid enough to permit approximately
reversible trading (low-friction trading), and whenever they are
liquid the friction usually cannot be ignored. For example, You
cannot immediately resell a new car to the dealer and get your
money back after signing the contract. He will make a second profit
from you, otherwise no trade will take place. The less liquid the
market, the bigger the spread (cars, housing). Bond traders and
specialists in stocks maintain bid/ask prices that represent small but
non-negligible ‘financial friction’. Discount brokerages offer low-
friction trades in a liquid market. Liquidity seems to require finite and
small but non-negligible friction. A trade likely will not be reversed if
the seller would lose a big profit via the reversal.
Black [25] emphasized that noise is essential for liquidity. Noise and
friction go together. Small friction (low transaction fees) is necessary
for a liquid market. Finite friction limits noise at the highest
frequencies (shortest time intervals) by placing a lower limit on price
changes that can speculated over with any hope of profit. An
enlightening toy model of the market, where prices change
discretely, is discussed by Osborne [26] who constructs realistic
examples of discrete supply and demand functions of price for
traders placing limit orders in the stock market. Here, we find a nice
example of econometrics as a good astronomer/physicist practiced
it.
Following Osborne, we can (to zeroth order) understand the
working of a stock market via the following model. Market orders
are always executed, so we ignore them in favor of limit orders,
which require a specialist (market maker) who tries to match supply
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to demand. If there were only market orders, then prices would often
be determined by matching total demand to total supply, as in the
economists’ idea of ‘equilibrium’, but only in the absence of ‘runs’ on
a stock. Limit orders prevent this ‘equilibrium’ from occuring even in
orderly markets.  Making trades possible at all is the stock specialist
(market maker), who starts each day with a definite supply of a
particular stock S and a definite supply of cash C. Both inventories
are large enough to take care of ‘normal’ trading with a specified
spread in bid/ask prices. How the specialist makes his profit via the
spread is described by Osborne, as is the size of the inventory C.The
job of the specialist is not to help to drive prices up or down, but to
try to keep price changes small and to maintain as orderly a market
as is possible, given excess supply and demand expressed by market
and limit orders. Very liquid markets (heavily-traded stocks and
bonds) have low financial friction whereas the transaction costs for
housing (real estate broker) are high in a relatively viscous market.
Three prices should normally be shown on your discount broker’s
web site in real time: the last sale price, a bid price and an ask price.
Assume for simplicity that trades are only made in round lots (100
shares). Suppose that a sell order for 200 shares of S is executed at
the bid price of 20 1/8, which we can take to be 1/8 of a dollar lower
than the ask price (typical bid/ask spreads may be 1/16 or 1/8 of a
dollar on the NYSE, depending on liquidity of the stock S). The next
bid and ask quotes will be lowered to 20 and 19 7/8. Correspondingly,
if the last limit order executed was a buy of one or more round lots,
then the bid/ask quotes are both increased by 1/8. If no one wants to
buy at 20 and there is a mass of buy orders at 10, then either the
bid/ask prices must be dropped dramatically or else trading in the
stock must be halted for the day (like closure of a bank when there’s a
threat of a run). The stock market is not in equilibrium: the bid/ask
and trading prices are not equilibrium prices. Even when one limit
order can be filled (by matching a buyer at 20 1/8 to a seller at 20,
e.g.), most limit orders cannot be filled: the total excess demand for
the stock S does not vanish. Economists label stock market trading as
‘equilibrium’ because they tend to label everything as ‘equilibrium’,
even when it is not. I discuss this in detail in part 8 below.
What about  the ‘real value’ of an asset like a stock? Black [25] argues
that ‘value’ is both random  and unobservable, whereas price is
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random and observable. Believing strongly in his unstated, therefore
undefined, notion of ‘equilibrium’, Black asserts that price always
tends to return to value after large deviations, but we will see in the
next section that the model used by Black and others to describe stock
market movements has no restoring forces, only random walkers.
Black also says that he will call the market ‘efficient’ if price is within
a factor of two of ‘value’. Since ‘value is both unobservable and
undefined, this assertion has no meaning. If we try to identify ‘value’
with price then we may fall into the trap of accepting the efficient
market hypothesis (EMH), which states that dart-throwing in
designing a portfolio is as effective trying to choose stocks on the
basis of some other rational basis, like an estimate of ‘value’. There is
evidence that dart-throwing can be beaten over short enough time
intervals that information has not had time to propagate to all
investors (see [27,28], for example). Not all speculators/investors
react the same at the same time to the same information, and
investors (agents) typically are not rational but act on ‘hunches’, on
the basis of someone else’s advice, or (as Black points out) on the
basis of noise perceived as information. Black observes that we never
can be certain that we have information instead of noise. He used the
now-popular term ‘noise trader’ and argued that ‘information
traders’ can make money by timing their trades to take advantage of
noise traders, who make up the bulk of the market and are
responsible for the liquidity of the market. The EMH is a good
assumption for agents who do not follow the news closely and who
react too slowly to anticipate changes in market conditions. The
EMH advises these agents to invest in index funds, and advises them
not to follow the advice of ‘financial advisors’, who generally do not
know any more about predicting market advances or declines in a
stock or the entire market than does a dart thrower. In the end, the
value of an asset like a stock or bond that you can’t eat, sleep in or
under, warm or cool yourself with, ride on, or use in any other
desired way without liquidating it is worth, at any given time t,
exactly what the highest bid in the market says it’s worth at that
time. It’s price at any later time is unknown and undetermined. This
does not prevent good traders from making money. Agents can
forget about the illusions of ‘value’ and ‘equilibrium’ and concentrate
on prices in the face of excess demand. This leads, quite naturally, to
globalization, to the capitalization of everything everywhere.
Whether or not it is a good idea is not discussed here.
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For neo-classical discussions of liquidity traps, where demand can’t
be matched to supply although agents have money to spend and
want to make trades, see Ackerlof [29] and Krugman [30].
All other things being equal, consumers prefer falling prices, or at
worst equilibrium, in a market whenever they have to buy items for
consumption or real use. People who buy stocks or offer credit prefer
rising prices of assets. No one who invests in the stock market wants
equilibrium (vanishing excess demand for the asset), because in that
case there are no gains (due to dividends or price appreciation). A
booming stock market is very far from equilibrium: the average
excess demand is positive and large, otherwise prices can’t increase.
The US stock market from April-October, 1999, is roughly
approximated by equilibrium (index funds like vfinx (Vanguard 500)
have approximately no net gain/loss). During that time many
individual stocks have taken big falls (cpq, one, tyc, ...)  while others
have skyrocketed (rhat, ge, ...). The fluctuations (‘volatility’) have
been large for many individual stocks. Most individual stocks are not
in equilibrium even when the market approximately is. Long-time
expectations of typical investors for the stock market are of
nonequilibrium (big gains), not equilibrium. No one would invest for
the long haul in a stock market that is expected to be in equilibrium.
Prices cannot rise unless the bidders dominate the askers, which is
very good for the askers: they can unload risky assets that otherwise
might produce no profit.
The stock market is generally not in equilibrium. Supply does not
match demand because all limit orders cannot be filled. There is no
‘clearing price’ for one day, only a range of bid/ask prices over which
trades were made with nonzero total excess demand during the
entire day. The notion of equilibrium is not very useful and is even
misleading in modeling financial data dynamically. I will oppose the
tradition of the economists to call the stock market an example of
equilibrium. Following the example set by Black  [25], if they do not
accept my argument and revise their description then I will attribute
it to noise. Likewise for the misconception that utility maximization
describes ‘equilibrium’.
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For an econometrician’s approach to stock market pricing see
O’Hara [31], where Osborne is not mentioned but utility is. For other
recent attempts to model markets, particularly limit orders, see
[32,34]. For a more recent discussion of noise traders see [34].
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5. Noise and stochastic models of price changes
Deterministic models have not proven useful for describing stock,
bond, and money market price motions. Evidence for deterministic
chaos was not found in market data [35]. One can relax budget
constraints to allow creation and annihilation of money, which is
realistic. Money is not conserved. It is created and destroyed via
credit, bond sales and recalls, defaults, etc. Money is created and
destroyed with the tap of a computer key. A model that a statistical
physicist may want to try to improve on is called the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM). CAPM is based upon the ‘law of one price’
[36], meaning that arbitrage possibilities that occur over short
enough time intervals have been acted on so that the economists’
notion of ‘price equilibrium’ (equal assets have equal values) holds.
The model uses random noise to represent the fact that we cannot
know what the future price of each of n assets Si will, even after
short time intervals. Economics and finance textbooks [2,36] teach
‘price equilibrium’, but trading houses live from arbitrage [37, 38].
Let p  be the price of asset S at time t and let r be the rate at which the
asset changes systematically in price, if there is a systematic change
in price. Money-asset markets are modeled by an excess demand of
the form
  dp
dt = ε(p) = r(t)p + η(t)             (22)
where r(t) is the drift rate for p and η includes everything else that
contributes to the excess demand. The right hand side of (22) is the
total excess demand for the asset. The net excess demand for S,                
ε(p) = rp + η, must be expected to be positive in order to attract
investors since most people do not willingly throw away money. If r
is constant and η = 0 , then we have exponential growth of wealth of
the asset compounded at interest rate r (nonequilibrium), as in a
savings account or treasury bill over a period when interest rates
don’t change. Interest and credit represent excess demand for money
(in Japan, in 1999, there is excess supply because people tend to save
rather than consume). When r is deterministic and there is no noise
then we have an example of a so-called ‘risk-free asset’ like a T-bill
(this is a definition, not a description). If we try to apply this picture
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to risky assets like bonds or stocks (historically mislabeled ‘securities’)
then r is not constant and is not determined in advance, and we may
treat it as noisy so that (22) is a Langevin equation where both r and
η represent noise. We can’t calculate the future price p(t) of the asset
because we don’t know what r(t) and η(t) will look like over the
investment period [0,∆t].
The earliest model of stock prices by Bachelier [39] sets r = 0 and takes
η to be Gaussian random noise (this is a model of an equilibrium
market because there is no expected price change ∆p). A Gaussian
distribution of η does not fit stock price changes. Osborne [39] created
a revolution in finance by pointing out that one should instead study
the variable x(t,∆t) = log(p(t + ∆t)/p(t)) = log(1 +∆p/p), where x is
Gaussian random noise with mean square fluctuation σ2.∆t. Osborne
found that stock prices could be fit approximately by this assumption
with σ (for a given stock) constant, which would mean that stock
prices are lognormally distributed. (Mandelbrot later found that
cotton prices have a Levy distribution at large price increments and
argued that σ is formally infinite). Osborne [39] argued that one
should study logp on the basis of Fechner’s law. Gunaratne [40]
argued that we need an additive variable, and x(t, ∆t) is additive, in
order to apply the central limit theorem. I note also that one needs an
additive variable on the left hand side of a Langevin equation
because we take random noise to be additive (stochastic integration).
The finance theorists then study the Langevin equation
  dp(t) =p(t)r(t)dt +p(t)η(t)dt        (23)
where η is Gaussian random noise. From here on I will use the
preferred language of finance and will use Doob’s form [41] of the
Langevin equation
  ∆pi = piri(t)∆t + pi σ∆B(t)       (24)
instead of the equation (23), because ‘stochastic calculus’ [41] based
on the Ito lemma [42,43,44] allows one to derive Smoluchowski
equations not only for p but also for functions w(p,t) of p, which leads
to option pricing:  w(p,t) may the price of an option to buy the asset
S. ∆p/p is the fractional change in price over a small but finite time
26
interval ∆t. Also, we can take w = logp to get the Langevin equation
for logp
  ∆log(pi(t + ∆t)/pi(t)) = pi(t)(ri(t) – σ2/2)∆t + pi(t) σ∆B(t) .  (24b)
In (24) ri is Gaussian random noise with expectation Ri and variance
σi
2, while ∆B is Gaussian random noise with mean equal to zero and
mean square fluctuation given by
  ∆B(∆t)2 = ∆t .               (24c)
In other words, both p and x are assumed to do a random walk,
including with respect to expectations about gain about some
average expected return R (we can also replace (24c) by a Levy flight
assumption to discuss fractional Brownian motion).
The beginning of the investment period for the portfolio of n assets
(S1,...Sn) is t, and the time horizon is ∆t. The CAPM model calculates
the total expected return R for the short investment period ∆t, the
sum of the fractional the price changes
  
Ri =
∆pi
pi = ri(t) ∆t ,           (25)
where the average is taken with probability density                        
P(r,∆B) = P(r)P(∆B), and where and P(r) and P(∆Β) both describe
uncorrelated Gaussian random noise. Economists refer to ‘forces’
that cause prices to return to ‘value’ after large fluctuations but
‘value’ is both undefined and unobservable, and there are no
‘restoring forces’ in this drunken sailor model (24) of stock prices. If
the random walker happens to hit or come near any particular price
a few times, at random time intervals, then that is just an accident
that will likely happen ‘if we wait long enough’ for a statistically
meaningful expectation value to be realized. However, no force, and
certainly not Adam Smith’s hand, has acted during the random walk,
where we must think of the entire right hand side of (24) as excess
demand. Excess demand is treated as random noise. If Ri is the
return on asset Si, then the return at time t on the portfolio of n + 1
assets will be
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r(t) = xiri(t)Σi = 0
n
          (26)
where So is a risk-free asset (ro = Ro is deterministic) and the other n
assets are risky (the Ri(t) are Gaussian random variables for                   
i = 1,2,...,n). Next, one writes
  
x0 = 1 – xiΣi = 1
n
           (27)
to obtain the (randomly fluctuating) portfolio return as
  
r(t) = R0 + xi(ri(t) – R0)Σi = 0
n
 .        (28)
If we form the mean square fluctuation of (r(t) - Ro) and minimize it
subject to the budget constraint
  
1 = xiΣi = 0
n
            (29)
and the constraint that the expected return at time t
  
R(t) = xiRi(t)Σi = 0
n
            (30)
is fixed, then we arrive at the prediction (31) of the CAPM also and
the definition of β. The portfolio is called ‘mean-variance-efficient’.
Given the expected return (31), minimizing the mean square
fluctuation in the portfolio return is seen as minimizing the risk
because the variance is here identified as the ‘risk’ [36]. Utility
maximization is forgotten in favor of risk minimization.
Suppose there is an index fund that is known to be more or less
efficient in this sense. Each of the n assets in this portfolio is risky.
The expected return of asset Sa in the portfolio is
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  Ra = Ro + β a(Re – Ro)         (31)
where βa= σae/σee, σee is the variance of the efficient portfolio and σae
is the covariance of the risky asset with the efficient portfolio (which
we may take to be the market itself, or an index fund). To try to
understand the Fed Chairman’s speeches, which can have a big
effect on liquid asset markets during a speculative bubble, it helps to
know what the phrase ‘risk premium’ means. The ‘risk premium’ is
simply the second term on the right hand side of (31) [36].
It has long been known that the prediction (31) of CAPM does not
agree with the data. The NYSE data show better returns for low-
beta stocks than for high ones from the investment period 4/57-12/65
[45,46], which is the reverse of the model’s prediction (higher returns
for higher risk). This model is based on  EMH, namely, that all assets
do a random walk so that dart-throwing is predicted to be as good as
any other method when it comes to choosing a portfolio of stocks.
Another way to say it is that the Brownian motion approximation
ignores short time intervals over which new information can cause
price changes and during which arbitrage is possible. As Black points
out, however, we can never be sure that the perceived information is
not really just noise.
The biggest fault with the model is that the variances, as Mandelbrot
showed (see also Malkiel [46] for later references), are not well-
defined but show sudden sharp changes when computed over
increasingly longer time horizons. In applying the model one can not
use a long time series to obtain a ‘global’, estimate for the variance.
One should instead estimate the variance locally for the period ∆t
over which the investment is made. The variance estimates must be
continually revised as time goes on. In the worst case one must
expect ‘surprises’ (like the collapse of prices of Compaq, Tyco,
Raytheon, Bank One, or any number of other observed large price
drops during spring-fall, 1999) that are not be included in the CAPM
estimate of risk (large deviations are ignored in the lognormal
model). These ‘surprises’ are the real nature of complexity, and by
their very nature [13] cannot be predicted by any model of the market.
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The stochastic equation (24) is far from a complete dynamical model:
it fails to predict R. For a thought-provoking discussion of the
complexity of trying to understand how to try to model a prediction
of R somewhat realistically, see [47]. No model explains why market
expectations R are sensitive to small interest rate changes. Malkiel
[46] produces a back of the envelope calculation that shows that this
could be understood if dividends (instead of price increases) were the
main thing causing agents to buy assets, but in a speculative bubble
(like the US stock market from 1994-1999, e.g.) dividend expectations
are likely negligible in comparison with expectations of capital
appreciation due to rising prices.
In the CAPM we have obtained an incomplete prediction without
having used utility. According to Varian [1] the CAPM can only be
made consistent with the economtrician’s notion of expected utility
in two restricted cases. Given a probability measure/distribution
µ(x), then if utility were a function we could define the expected
utility as
  U t = U(x,t)dµ(x,t) .      (32)
An example of a probability measure is the empirical measure
defined by the data. Varian shows that optimization of expected
utility will not reduce to the CAPM unless (I) the utility is quadratic,
or else (II) all n assets are themselves normally-distributed.
However, Merton has derived the entire picture from utility theory
[48]. The main point is that we do not need utility to arrive at the
CAPM, nor do we need utility to derive the Black-Scholes model. The
expected utility functional is used in stochastic control theory, and
gives rise to the diffusive ‘Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman’ equation of
stochastic dynamic programming theory [42,48,49]. However, the
word ‘utility’ cannot be found in many other interesting and useful
books on finance [36,43,44,50,51].
6. Black-Scholes Option pricing
Black and Scholes (B-S) give two easy derivations of their option
pricing equation (for those who are bored by easy to follow
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derivations, see Merton [48]). The second derivation is the most
enlightening, and provided Black’s motivation [52]: the B-S equation
is a straightforward application of the CAPM. This viewpoint is
most useful, as it shows that modification or falsification of one
model requires the immediate modification of the other.
An option to buy an asset is the right to buy the asset at a specified
price P within a specified time horizon T (the option expires at time T
if not exercised). A ‘European’ call option can only be exercised at
time T and will be exercised only if p - P ≥ 0, where all financial
friction (brokerage costs) are ignored in this discussion. For 0 ≤ t < T
the option price w(p,t) obeys P ≤ w ≤ p. The question is: for 0 ≤ t < T
how should the option be priced? The future condition at t = T holds,
  w(p,T) = {p – P if p ≥ P, 0 if p < P}.      (33)
The idea is to apply the CAPM to two assets, a stock S and it’s option
Os. Following Black and Scholes [53], note first that since for small
price changes  
  ∆w = ∂w∂x ∆x .       (34)
This yields
  ∆w
w =
∆p
p (
p
w
∂w
∂x )         (35)
so that
  βw = pw ∂w∂x βp .          (36)
Let
  ∆R = Re – ro              (37)
denote the difference between the expected return on the efficient
portfolio (which we can take to be the market itself, or an index fund)
and the interest rate on risk-free assets. β∆R is the risk premium.
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In the CAPM we have the expected returns for the stock and option
are given by
  ∆p
p = Rp∆t = ro∆t + ∆Rβp∆t
∆w
w = Rw∆t = ro∆t + ∆Rβw∆t.        (38)
According to Ito calculus [43], and because
  ∆p2 = σp2∆t ,                      (39)
for short space-time intervals we have
  
∆w = w(p + ∆p, t + ∆t) – w(p,t) = ∂w∂p ∆p +
∂w
∂t ∆t + p
2σp
∂2w
∂p2 ∆t
.  (40)
Taking the expectation value of this equation divided by w and
combining with (38) yields the B-S equation
  ∂w
∂t = row – rop
∂w
∂p –
1
2p
2σp
∂2w
∂p2
.     (41)
This is a backward-time diffusion equation. The final price w(P,T)
and expiration date T are  fixed, so the equation must be solved by
backward integration in t to find the solution (forward time solutions
do not exist). This derivation is not exhibited in popular texts [37,38]
but is very enlightening because it shows that the limitations on the
CAPM and B-S options pricing are the same. Both can, at best, be
used over short enough time intervals ∆t that there are no drastic
changes (surprises) in expected returns and variances due to shifts in
agents’ expectations in the market. The models can’t be extended to
long times without empirically revising the estimates for gain and
variance as surprises occur. See [44] for the use of ‘implied volatility’.
Like the CAPM, the predictions of the B-S model are wrong: out of
the money options are systematically priced too low by the model,
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and in the money options are priced too high. The fault lies with the
lognormal assumption: the lognormal distribution is too fat near the
peak and too small in the wings to fit stock prices accurately. Traders
claim [54] that the model does not work at all for stocks (individual
stock price distributions are themselves too noisy) but works for
bonds and foreign exchange if ‘smile’ is introduced. ‘Smile’(or
‘frown’) is the assumption that σ varies with p, which violates the
model. ‘Smile’ is the engineers’ way of fudging the parameters to
make the predictions of the model ‘work’. An improvement was
discovered by Gunaratne [40], who found that the exponential
distribution
  
p(x,t) = Ae
γ(x – δ)
, x < δ
Ae–ν(x – δ) x ≥ δ
 (41b)
holds for all price ranges in x(t,∆t) of the log of price increments for
bonds and foreign exchange (individual stock distributions were too
noisy to draw conclusions), where δ α t [40]. Littel-known is that an
option pricing model for the exponential distribution is also derived
in [40], which was never published because the work was done in a
trading house rather than at a university. For other attempts to go
beyond Black-Scholes see nearly any recent issue of the International
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance.
A Hurst exponent, consistent with ∆x as a Levy flight, has been
extracted from market index [55,56] and foreign exchange [57] data.
The exponential distribution can be distinguished from a Levy
distribution if the price information is accurate enough that terms
O(logx) can be detected in data analysis.
Option pricing with absorbing boundaries was solved for the
exponential distribution by Gunaratne [58].
7. Deterministic chaos vs. random noise at short times
The main point built into a Wiener process is that at the shortest
times stock prices are completely unpredictable: the price is
everywhere continuous but has no derivative. This is consistent with
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short time unpredictability of real prices, which change in discrete
units over very short discrete time intervals.
A flow in phase space has a completely opposite short time behavior.
Chaotic and complex dynamical systems found in nature are not
predictable at long times (mathematical models are still represented
by computable dynamics so long as all parameters used in the model
are computable), but at short times the flow is trivial: any flow can
always be parallelized (‘rectified’) over a short enough finite time
interval. Over a short enough time interval there is always a
coordinate system (reachable via a differentiable transformation)
where the motion is free particle motion [11] (local integrability).
Chaotic systems are pseudo-random over long time intervals but are
models of perfect predictability over the shortest time intervals. One
can never ‘derive’ (23) from a phase  flow like (8), although it is
possible to use a system that is chaotic to generate discrete pseudo-
random time series at long times. However, short-time integrability
of phase flows like (8) and (19) is violated in the worst possible way
by stochastic dynamical models. I have argued elsewhere that
driven-dissipative chaotic deterministic dynamics generally cannot
be replaced by stochastic dynamics [5].
Another way to emphasize the incompatibility of the deterministic
and random models is to note that diffusion equations generate no
characteristic curves [18]. The characteristic curves are the particle
picture (for the same reason there is no particle, or wave, description
of the Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics). First order
partial differential equations, linear and nonlinear, are equivalent to
particle systems but the only second order differential equation that
generates characteristic curves is the wave equation [18].
Generally speaking, in finance theory one could forget the entire
elaborate framework of GET except that books by theorists like
Merton still attempt to ‘save the appearance’ by trying to use the
elaborate language of GET to describe far from equilibrium
phenomena (‘epicycles’ by a new name). Black, on the other hand,
advised experimentation and did not expect econometrics to survive
in it’s neo-classical form [59].
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8. Nonequilibrium and instability in stochastic dynamics
According to economists predictions based on (24) are called
‘equilibrium’ even when the average excess demand does not vanish
(R = 0 is not guaranteed and is even undesirable from an investor’s
standpoint). Even worse, they speak of ‘market forces’ that return
the prices ‘to value’ (meaning, presumably, ‘equilibrium’) in spite of
the fact that the drunken sailor described by (24) feels no restoring
force whatsoever and may even wander far from equilibrium. A
restoring force could only be introduced by letting the average drift R
depend on price, by making a price potential well, e.g. Financial
markets are instead modeled by a collection of n drunken sailors
(assets) with constant average drifts R. The job of the Fed Chairman
is to try to use words to restrain any collective drift of the drunken
sailors, and also via interest rates and the money supply.
Let me describe the ‘equilibrium’ assumed to exist by the economist.
The usual argument says to subtract out the systematic return R and
study the fluctuations about that ‘equilibrium’, which is supposed to
be described by a rescaled price
 p = pe–Rt (41)
that should satisfy
 dp
dt = 0 . (41b)
in some sense. Such rescaling cannot be performed for an individual
stock  because for stocks R is unknown and is not even well-defined.
The standard argument is that we can do this rescaling for bonds and
foreign exchange, for the market as a whole, or for an index fund. I
will now show that rescaling does not lead to the idea of equilibrium
even for a low-risk asset, one where r is deterministic. Take the
simplest case of a constant interest rate r over some time horizon t,
for a treasury bond, e.g.,
  ∆p
p = r∆t + σ∆B(t) .    (42)
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Stochastic integration then yields
  p(t) = poe(r – σ2/2)teσ∆B(t),     (43)
so that we can rescale the price by the deterministic/systematic part
to obtain
  p(t) = p(t)e–(r – σ2/2)t = poeσ∆B(t) .  (43b)
We can study stability by calculating the moments of the Gaussian
distribution P(∆B), and obtain
  p(t)k = = pko ekσ∆B(t) = pko ek
2σ2t/2
.   (44)
Clearly, this is not an ‘equilibrium’ distribution because, even if one
chose a different scaling factor, e.g., in order to make the second
moment stable, then the rescaled higher moments will all still
diverge as t increases. The idea of defining statistical equilibrium by
rescaling prices is not possible. Another way to see that we are not in
equilibrium is to calculate the entropy of either the lognormal, or
observed exponential distribution (41b) (where δ α t),  and observe
that the entropy of the distribution
 S(t) = – p(x,t) log p(x,t) dx
    (45)
 increases with time. An equilibrium distribution would maximize the
entropy subject to some constraint, which would allow the analog of
the inverse temperature to be introduced to describe hypothetical
‘reversible trading’ due to the prevalence of lots of noise with low
financial friction. In the absence of price potential wells, the drunken
sailors can maximize the entropy and achieve equilibrium only if we
introduce walls (upper and lower bounds on prices, or government
controls) to confine the sailors. Negative feedback might stabilize the
random walkers, as the Fed Chairman has hoped, but there is no
evidence in the data that this psychologic approach can always be
relied on.
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The origin of the economists’ misconception of stochastic dynamics
as market ‘equilibrium dynamics’ follows from the misconception
that maximizing the expected utility yields equilibrium. It doesn’t,
whereas maximizing the entropy would.
The idea that the bond and foreign exchange markets obey the
exponential distribution seems at odds with the idea that markets
are complex. In a complex system the distribution cannot be known
in advance [13]. One can only watch to see how events unfold and
then record them, but this unfolding gives no information about
future surprises. Complexity could only arise in a market obeying
exponential statistics via ‘surprises’, like changes in agents’
expectations, that would violate the exponential distribution. That
is, if agents should become aware that they are creating an
exponential distribution and then try to exploit that information, our
expectation is that the distribution of price changes x will change.
To the extent that prices are exponential, not lognormal, standard
stochastic optimization theory will not work. A second order
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman diffusion equation cannot be derived to
describe the dynamics.
 Notice also that for finite and large ∆t we have on the basis of (42)
that
  p(t + ∆t) – p(t)
p(t) = e
R∆t
– 1
   (45)
  
so that the CAPM prediction would hold only for Rd∆t << 1 even if
the lognormal model were correct. An improved CAPM based on the
exponential distribution will be presented later.
A positive expected gain R can be a destabilizing factor that may
actually produce increasing prices if agents act on the same
expectations. According to the empirical data there are no internal
‘restoring forces’ that can stabilize a free market (the Fed Chairman
implicitly acts on this assumption by trying to ‘talk down’ the
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speculative bubble of 1995-’99)). Adam Smith’s hand simply does not
exist in this picture, where the balancing of supply with demand
occurs randomly, infrequently, and only by accident. As Lewis points
out [37], a brokerage house is a ‘full-service casino’. Unlike Las Vegas
and Monte Carlo, they will not only accept your bets but will even
lend you the money to bet with (margin trading)! Margin is a
dangerous form of credit, so beware the gamblers’ ruin (for an
example of the gamblers’ ruin in action, see the history of LTCM
[38,60]).
Merton stresses, in writing down (24), that he assumes that all
agents/investors have the same expectations about the dynamics of
the market. Bubbles and crashes are caused by uniform expectations
of many agents (with adequate capital) acting relatively coherently.
Restrictions that make capital more expensive for speculation
discourage expectations, causing bubbles to deflate. This is the hope
of the Federal Reserve Chairman late in 1999. This is all in keeping
with the idea that social behavior is not like natural law [5], but is
actually created to some extent by expectations. Krugman [30] sees
runs on a currency as an example of self-fulfilling expectations.
Black, who wrote beautifully and clearly like a very good physicist,
was a firm believer in ‘equilibrium’, but his idea of ‘equilibrium’
apparently was not that of econometrics. He regarded the B-S
equation as an ‘equilibrium’ model, so that the market is ‘in
equilibrium’, for Black, when the model prices the options correctly
(markets are not lognormal, but we can take the corrected B-S
formula of [40] as the standard here). Black’s idea of ‘equilibrium’
threfore seems more to corespond to the EMH, to the idea that
arbitrage possiblilites are not present because information traders
have eliminated them (so that ‘the law of one price’ holds
temporarily), than to any dynamic idea of equilibrium that we have
discussed in parts 1- 3 above. That is, I think that where Black writes
‘equilibrium’ we must substitute efficient market/no arbitrage
possible.
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9. Econo-logic vs empirical data
“Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world....Let those
who will, write the nation’s laws, if I can write it’s textbooks.”
(P. Samuelson, quoted by Berstein [61])
Is econometrics scientific? Since Galileo, the abstraction that
constitutes a science must be empirically based. Forgetting for the
moment about dynamics, can the idea of a utility function with (2) be
used to predict or even describe demand, supply, and prices in real
markets, or in somewhat realistic toy models of markets when we
look at empirical data? Osborne [26] asked whether there is evidence
that supply-demand curves pass this basic test. The evidence for
econometrics, if it exists, does not appear in Samuelson’s text. The
supply-demand ‘graphs’ in Samuelson are just ‘cartoons’ that are
not based upon any known empirical data. Economists like to discuss
elasticity (requiring a continuously differentiable utility) but do not
show that utility can be measured and do not estimate it or it's slopes
(marginal utilities) from real data. There is, as Osborne pointed out,
a very good reason for this. Given a hypothesized abstract utility
(purely theoretical, not empirical), one could then use (2) to derive
the predicted price vector p for n commodities as a function of
demand or supply x, p = f(x,λ). Osborne points out that this relation
cannot be extracted from real data, and observes that there is no
unique price as a function of demand or supply, calling into question
(2) as the basis for anything . Nonintegrability of a Hamiltonian
system yields exactly such behavior [16]. Example: given twenty
tomatoes (supply), all other things being equal, then what's the price?
Answer: anything or nothing. Question, given demand for 50 Ford
Mondeos/Contours, what's the price? Answer: not able to decide it
empirically (nearly twice the price in Germany as in America, in fact,
but arbitrage is not attractive due to taxes and shipping prices, i.e.,
due to ‘financial friction’). Osborne’s observation is bad news for
econometrics: it implies that the idea of path-independent utility
makes no sense empirically (writing down utility as a functional may
make sense whenever there is something to optimize, if we know the
dynamics in advance). Osborne illustrates that demand and supply as
a function of price do seem to make sense empirically and gives as
examples shopping for dresses and filling market limit orders. Black
[25] later pointed out that discrete data on demand as a function of
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price are extremely noisy, so that in practice the required curves can’t
be constructed from known empirical data.
10. Conclusion
I have shown that utility generally does not exist as a function, that
utility maximization is not an equilibrium condition, and therefore
that price generally cannot be expected to be defined as a function of
demand variables. This means that standard econometrics is wrong,
inapplicable (no great surprise to anyone, presumably) and cannot
form the basis for intelligently-made socio-economic policy
decisions. I point out further that market models are not equilibrium
models, that there is no stability either in the models nor in asset
price data. The entropy can be defined, but it is never maximized in
an unregulated free market. Equilibrium does not prevail, and is not
a useful idea for understanding real markets. As we well-know since
the collapse of LTCM, the market cannot be counted on  always to be
relatively ‘efficient’ either: surprises occur in the form of large,
unanticipated deviations from all model predictions.
Econometricians sometimes admit that their field is more like logic
and pure mathematics than it is like an empirical science like physics
[14,62]. Econometrics has a history of contributions by pure
mathematicians, with very little input by physicists (see [26] for an
attempt by an astronomer). Theoretical finance, through Osborne,
Mandelbrot, Black, Scholes, and Merton, although still too much
tied to Osborne’s (wrong) lognormal distribution (see any text on
finance), has developed from very different initial conditions, has
developed more as an attempt to be an empirical science. But can
central bankers, corporations, trading houses and hedge funds be
expected successfully to turn Moscow into Wall Street and
Chihuahua into Wal Mart? Neither the ABH model nor stochastic
control theory provide any theoretical foundation for that
expectation. Globalization, the capitalization of everything
everywhere, is a very large uncontrolled experiment where no one
knows the outcome. Events like the collapse of the USSR, the
financial crises in Mexico and the Far East, the financial crisis in
Brazil, and the collapse of Long Time Capital Management (LTCM)
are examples of ‘surprises’ that were not predicted by any theory and
which were not anticipated by many very astute financial agents
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(however, see [38] for Scholes’ warning to LTCM before it crashed).
The fact that markets operate on the basis of noise and complexity
rather than on the basis of Adam Smith’s controlling/stabilizing
hand means that anything can happen, including long runs of either
pleasant or unpleasant events. For a history of the evolution of the
idea of Adam Smith’s hand, see [63].
Black [59] points out that econometric theorizing is not accepted on
the basis of experiment, but because researchers persuade one
another that the theory is ‘correct and relevant’. This, alone, is not
enough to establish a theory in physics where precise identical
repeated, experiments are performed (or in astronomy where there
are no controlled experiments but careful observation provides
accurate data), although string theory and various too-ambitious
models in cosmology are open to some criticism on this count. Black
expected that experiments eventually will be done in economics and
finance whenever the desire is great enough. LTCM was a
completely uncontrolled experiment. LTCM suffered the gamblers’
ruin because the usual econometric expectations about arbitrage and
market efficiency proved wrong: certain bond interest spreads
widened instead of returning to (Black’s idea of) ‘equilibrium’, as ‘the
law of one price’ assumes they should. The problem here is that the
decay of small deviations from thermodynamic equilibrium forms the
model for what the economists expect, but there is no correct thermal
equilibrium analogy for real markets, which are complex, far from
equilibrium stochastic dynamical systems. Complex deterministic
dynamics has been investigated [13,21], but complex stochastic
dynamics remains an unvisited frontier.
In qualitative agreement with Black, a former dynamical systems
theorist who worked in econometrics [15] argues that econometrics is
socially-constructed and notes that the notion of market equilibrium
was philosophically soothing in a time when conservatives and
others were afraid of revolt and revolution by the masses. General
Equilibrium Theory is more like a mathematics-based ideology than
like a science. In the age of complexity it will not likely survive
whereas Newtonian mechanics not only survived but generated the
field of deterministic chaos, and has been speculated to contain
complexity as well [13]. The recent deregulation of
banking/insurance/brokerage, another uncontrolled experiment in
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finance, combined with the lack of regulation of options trading will
likely lead to surprises.
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